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This Communication is intended to inform the Member States on the criteria which 
the Commission will usc in assessing under Community law provisions relating to 
the costing and financing of universal service within national schemes for universal 
service ("National Schemes"). 
No requirement is  imposed on Member States to  set up National Schemes to  share 
any financial burden resulting from the cost of universal service provision amongst 
market players. 
However,  where  such  schemes  arc  implemented  they  must  be  compatible  with 
Community  law,  and  in  particular,  with  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of 13 
March  1996  amending  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  regarding  the 
implementation  of  full  competition  in  telecommunications  markets  ("the  Full 
Competition  Directive")  and  with  the  provisions  endorsed  by  the  Council  and 
European Parliament in the proposed Council and European Parliament Directive on 
Interconnection 
1 ("the Interconnection Directive"). 
National Schemes must necessarily be adapted in the light of the specific conditions 
in the Member States, particularly the conditions in less developed regions within the 
Community.  At the same time, the underlying principles for costing and financing 
universal  service  within  those  schemes  should  be  the  same  throughout  the 
Community, even though the costs eventually calculated may be closely related to 
the prevailing economic, social and geographical conditions.  This Communication 
also provides guidance on principles for the operation of  National Schemes. 
According to the Full Competition Directive National Schemes must be notified to the 
Commission.  This Communication therefore identifies in Sections 2 and 3 the  legal 
principles <md approaches which the Commission expects to find in National Schemes 
notified to  it, if such schemes arc to be judged to be compatible with the Community 
legal framework. It also in Section 4 examines those aspects of  universal service which 
arc primarily addressed at a national level. In Section 5 provides additional detail in the 
form of Guidelines for National Regulatory Authorities as to the operation of national 
schemes for universal service in the area of  telecommunications. 
This  Communication  docs  not  create  enforceable  rights.  Moreover,  it  does  not 
prejudice  the  final  assessment  of National  Schemes  notified  to  the  Commission. 
That assessment will necessarily take into account the situation prevailing at the time 
of  notification ofNational Schemes. 
COMMON  POSITION  (EC)  No  34/96  adopted  by  the  Council  on  18  June  1996  with  a  view  to 
adopting Directive 96/  .. ./EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on interconnection in 
telecommunications with regnrd to ensuring universal service and interopcrability through application 
of  the principles of  open network provision (ONP). 
1b 2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1  The definition, scope and financing of Universal Service 
The  concept  of universal  service  will  play  an  important  part  in  meeting  the 
challenges of the Information Socictl.  It is based on the principles of universality, 
equality, continuity and affordability. 
Universal Service is defined in the Interconnection Directive as: 
"a defined minimum set of  services of  specified quality which is available to all 
users  independent of their geographical location and,  in  the  light of  !.pecific 
national conditions, at an affordable price". 
In March of this year, the Commission indicated that that defined service equates to 
"the prm•ision of  voice telephony service •'ia a j"LXed connection which  willa/so allow a 
fax and a modem to  operate,  as  well as  the provision of  operator assistance, emergency 
and tlirectory enquiry services (including the provision of  subscriber directories)  and the 
. .  if  b/'  l  3 "  prOVISIOil 0  pu  IC payprlOill!S . 
It also indicated that according to Directive 95/62/EC
4 (the "Voice Telephony Directive"), 
"Users should also have access  to  published information about the cost ami prices of 
services, about their quality and whether targets for quali~p are being met". 
Finally, the Commission stressed in that Communication that universal service was a 
dynamic  and  evolving  concept  and  that  it  would  be  kept  under  regular  review, 
particularly,  with  regard  to  its  scope,  level,  quality  and  affordability  within  the 
European Union.  The Commission is due to report for the first time by I st January 
1998.  In this context, the question of possible financing of preferential tariffs  for 
access  to  Intcmet  type  networks  by  schools  as  mentioned  in  the  Action  Plan 
"Leaming in the  Information  Society", adopted  by  the  Commission  last  October, 
could  also  be  considered.  One  initial  important  evolution  is  found  in  the  recent 
proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive which adapts the Voice 
Telephony Directive to a competitive environment
5
•  This proposal, for example, no 
longer equates universal service with access solely via a fixed line, but rather with 
provision of a defined service to a fixed location, allowing delivery via a fixed line 
or a  wireless  connection.  This  recognises  the  role  of wireless  delivery  to  fulfil 
universal service obligations where this is the least costly technology. 
See Commission Communication of 13  March  1996 on universal service in the perspective of a fully 
liberalised environment, COM(96) 73  and Commission Communication on general interest services in 
Europe, COM(96) 443. 
See  Communication  of  13  March  1996  on  Universal  Service  for  telecommunications  in  the 
perspective of  a fully liberalised environment, COM(96) 73. 
Directive 95/62/EC of the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of 13  December  1995  on  the 
application of  open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, OJ L32l, 30.12.96 
Proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on  the  application  of open  network 
provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive 
environment, COM(96) 419, 11.9.96. 
2 The net cost of such universal service obligations may, where it represents an unfair 
burden  on  the  organisation  providing  universal  service,  be  shared  amongst  other 
market  players.  Section  2.3  below  provides  an  overview  of Community  law 
applying to the costing and financing of  universal service. 
2.2  Policy aims underlying the financing of universal service 
National schemes for  financing  universal  service should be  consistent with certain 
basic policy aims at a European level.  Such schemes must, as far as possible: 
minimise  market entry  barriers,  whilst providing adequate  guarantees  for  the 
financing of  universal service. 
respect  the  need  for  neutrality  (e.g.  between  particular  market  players  I 
particular  technologies  or  between  integrated  or  unbundled  provision  of 
services) in order to  avoid distorting the pattern of market entry or subsequent 
investment decisions and/or market activity. 
keep any administrative burden and related costs to a minimum 
be  based  on  objective,  transparent,  proportional  and  non-discriminatory 
procedures, and 
create  an environment  which  stimulates  greater  efficiency  and  innovation  m 
order to ensure the delivery of  universal service at a lower cost over time. 
Whilst Member States remain free,  in  line  with the  principle of subsidiarity to  set 
additional  obligations relating to  particular technologies and  facilities  and/or to  set 
service and coverage targets (e.g.  for  Mobile Services or for  ISDN), any financial 
burden  associated with  their provision  may  not  be  funded  out of the  mechanism 
established for financing universal service. 
2.3  The decision whether or not to create a National Scheme to fund the 
net cost of universal senricc in a Member State 
In line with subsidiarity, the National Regulatory Authority is  free  to  determine on 
the basis ofthe audited costs of universal service, that: 
Universal  service  financing  is  not  required,  either  because  universal  service 
obligations do  not result in  a net cost, or that either (i) the net cost established 
does not represent an unfair burden for the operator(s) concerned or (ii)  it does 
not justify the administrative costs of  a specific financing scheme. 
Universal  service  obligations do  represent a burden,  but the  State chooses to 
finance it directly or indirectly. 
Universal  service  obligations  arc  considered  a  burden  and  that  a  specific 
universal  service  financing  scheme  is  required.  In  such  a  case  the  National 
Schemes must be in accordance with Community law. 
3 6 
2.4  ReJev:mt Community law applying to the costing and financing of 
universal service 
The general principles and policy aims set out above arc derived  from  the  current 
framework for  costing and financing universal service (S'ee  Annex A for  le~islative 
references).  That framework imposes specific obligations on the Member States. 
2. 4.1  The Full Competition Directive 
According to the Full Competition Directive, Member States are required to notify to 
Commission  no  later  than  1 January  1997  any  licensing  or  declaration  schemes 
aimed at compliance with ''financial obligations with regard to  universal service"
6
• 
These schemes must be published by the Member States no  later than 1 July  1997 
and before they arc implemented the Commission must "verify the  compatibility of 
these  drafts  with  the  Treaty"  (Article  3).  This  process  of verification  by  the 
Commission will therefore take place during the early part of 1997. 
The  criteria  which  such  schemes  must  follow  are  set  out  in  Article  4C  of the 
Directive.  These permit Member States to  make use  of either a universal  service 
fund or a system of supplementary charges.  The approach chosen can apply only to 
undertakings providing public telecommunications networks and must "allocate the 
respective  burden  accordin~ to  objective  and non-discriminatory  criteria  and in 
accordance with the principle of  proportionality". 
Finally, the Commission is also required to  review such universal service schemes 
no later than 1 January 2003 to assess whether the schemes in place "limit access to 
relevant markets". 
2.4.2  The Interconnection Directive 
The proposed Interconnection Directive will set out a framework which goes beyond 
the principles found in the  Full Competition Directive.  Whilst the latter directive 
identifies obligations flowing  from the Treaty with regard to  universal service, the 
Interconnection  Directive  builds  on  those  principles  to  propose  a  common, 
harmonised framework for the costing and financing of universal service within the 
Member States. 
According  to  Article  5(1)  of the  Interconnection  Directive,  Member  States  may 
establish  mechanisms  for  sharing  the  net  cost  of universal  service  with  other 
organisations  "operating  public  telecommunications  network'>  and/or  publicly 
Where universal service schemes are put in place other than via a licensing or declaration procedure, 
Article 4C of the Directive requires Member States to notify any national scheme to share the net cost 
of the provision of universal service obligations for verification with the Treaty.  In  this case, such 
schemes must be notified by II January 1997 rather than the slightly sooner date set for licensing and 
declaration procedures. 
Later dates for notification may apply to those Member States to which the Commission grants additional 
transitional periods in respect to opening up of their markets to competition.  Notification dates in those 
cases will be set out in  the decision granting the additional transitional periods.  Where Member States 
do not immediately create National  Schemes  for  universal service,  but do  so  at  a  future  date,  the 
Commission  would  expect  such  schemes  to  be  notified  to  the  Commission  in  order to  allow  an 
assessment of  their compatibility with Community Jaw in good time before their entry into force. 
4 available voice telephony services".  In common with the Full Competition Directive 
contributions must  be  determined  in  an  objective,  transparent,  non-discriminatory 
and proportional manner. 
Article 5(2),  in common with the Full  Competition Directive, envisages either an 
independent universal service fund at a national level or a system of supplementary 
charges in addition to interconnection payments. 
Only  the  fixed  public  telephone  network  and  fixed  public  telephony  services  as 
identified in Section 2.1  above (i.e. Annex I Part 1 of the Interconnection Directive) 
can be financed via a universal service financing mechanism
7
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The Interconnection Directive provides (Article  5(3) and Annex III)  principles for 
calculating the net cost of universal service.  That net cost represents "the difference 
between  the  net  cost  for  an  organisation  of operating  with  universal  service 
obligations and operating without  the  universal service  obligations".  It requires 
these calculations to be made available to National Regulatory Authorities on request 
and for  those calculations to  be  audited  by  the National Regulatory  Authority  or 
other competent body, with the results being made public. 
National Regulatory Authorities are required to  assess whether a specific financing 
mechanism is justified, taking account of the  market benefit which accrues to  the 
organisation providing universal service (Article 5(  4  )). 
Finally, procedures for cost sharing and the mechanisms used should be open to the 
public.  National Regulatory Authorities should also publish on an  annual basis a 
report  giving  the  cost  of universal  service and  the  contributions  made  by  all  the 
parties involved (Article 5(5)). 
2.4.3  The role of  state aids 
Where Member States decide to fund, directly or indirectly through the State budget, 
part or all of  the net cost of universal service in the telecommunications sector, such 
interventions must be made in  a manner which is  consistent with the  EC  Treaty's 
rules on State Aids which are set out in Articles 92 to 94 together with Article 90. 
Such funding  should  be  transparent  and  should  not  exceed  the  net  costs  of the 
obligations calculated in  line  with guidelines provided in this Communication.  In 
cases  where  it will  be soundly established that there  is  no  overcompensation (eg. 
when  there  is  no  compensation of costs  which  should  normally  be  borne  by the 
relevant activity) of the cost of public service, there will normally be no state aid in 
the meaning of  Article 92(1) EC.  Conversely, when the public intervention will lead 
to  an  overcompensation, the  Commission will  have  to  determine  whether the  aid 
involved can be approved under one of  the derogations of  Article 92(2)and(3). 
As  mentioned  at  2.1  above,  the  Commission  has  proposed  a  modification  to  the  current  Voice 
Telephony  Directive.  When  adopted,  this  will  develop  further  the  precise scope of the  universal 
service  concept  within  the  European  Community,  in  particular,  with  regard  to  the  obligation  of 
affordability. 
5 Examples of such  direct  support could  include  providing support from  the  social 
security budcct to particular operators, or directly to certain customers, to cover the 
cost of  special equipment or tariff  packages for users '}'ith disabilities. 
3.  THE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA TO BE USED IN REVIEWING 
NATIONAL SCHEMES 
The list below identifies the assessment the Commission will use when examining 
national legislation implementing national schemes for universal service. 
In  Section  5 below more detailed guidelines  are provided for National Regulatory 
Authorities in  the  Member  States  in  relation  to  the  operation of  National Schemes. 
These  guidelines  aim  to  develop  best practice  within  the  sector  and draw  on  the 
principles set out below. 
Member States must ensure that National Schemes comply with Community law. 
In assessing the conformity with Community law of  National Schemes notified to it, 
the Commission will examine the following points : 
The  Commission  will  examine  the  national  approach  to  calculating  the  cost  of 
universal service and, in particular, will consider the following points : 
1.  National Schemes may only cover the "net cost" of universal service obligations 
as defined in Community law (i.e.  the costs associated with the provision of the 
public fixed telephone networks and publicly available fixed telephone service
8
). 
The calculation should  take account of both  costs  and revenues.  The costing 
approach  should  be  forward  looking,  rather  than  based  on  historical  cost 
accounting principles. 
For an explanation of  what is meant by "net cost" and the methodology which is 
suitable  in  calculating  the  net  cost  of universal  service  obligations  see  the 
guidelines in Section 5 below. 
2.  National Schemes must ensure that the net cost of universal service is calculated 
according to objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportional criteria 
and procedures. 
3.  In order to meet the requirement for transparency and proportionality in the Full 
Competition Directive, National Schemes must ensure that an operator claiming 
universal  service  financing  clearly  identify  (for  example  by  way  of a  formal 
declaration), which customers or groups of customers it formally refuses to serve 
or it intends to disconnect, unless the burden associated with offering service to 
them is shared via a National Scheme. This docs not require an operator to identify 
those customers individually.  Nevettheless, it should be able to indicate the number 
of  customers involved in relation to particular groups or particular areas. 
Sec Annex! Part I of  the Interconnection Directive. 
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The Commission will examine National Schemes to ensure that they do not seck 
to  recover net costs which arc  not attributable to  universal  service  obligations, 
and, in particular, it will seek to ensure that the following arc not included in any 
cost calculation for universal service. 
4.  National  Schemes may  not be  used  to  recover  an  'access  deficit  contribution' 
attributable  to  unbalanced  national  tariff  structures
9
•  The  issue  l~(  such 
contributions is addressed in Annex B. 
In  order to  assess the  compatibility of  National Schemes  with  Community law, 
schemes  notified to  the  Commission  must  include  a  timetable for  the  jillure 
phasing  out  of remaining  tariff imbalances.  Such  rebalancing  should  be 
completed,  at the latest,  by 1 January 2000,  except in  the case of  those Member 
States who  have been granted an  additional implementation period pursuant to 
Article  1  (2)  of the  Full  Competition  Directive.  In  such cases  the  date for the 
completion  of such  rebalancing shall  be  the  date  upon  which  that additional 
implementation period ends. 
5.  Furthermore,  on  the  basis  of the  Full  Competition  Directive  it  would  be 
disproportionate for National Schemes to be used to recover costs associated with 
activities which are not within the scope of  universal service, for example: 
- the  cost  of implementing  specific  measures  required  for  purposes  of public 
security; 
- the provision of communication services outside the scope of universal service 
to schools, hospitals or similar institutions; 
- compensation  and/or  refund  payments  (or  administrative  and  other  costs 
associated with such payments)  made  to  users  as  a  result of f.1ilurc  to  meet 
specified service quality levels; 
- the cost of replacement and/or upgrading of telecommunications equipment in 
the course of  normal network modernisation; 
6.  No account may be taken in calculating the net cost of  universal service obligations 
of the cost of itemised billing, and other facilities  (e.g.  selective call  barring and 
calling-line  identification)  where  such  facilities  arc  imposed  as  obligations to  all 
voice telephony operators. 
Where it is not possible to complete the rebalancing of tariffs by  I January 1998, Member States may, 
in  line  with  the  Full  Competition  Directive  (sec  Recital  20),  establish  mechanisms separate from 
National Schemes for  universal service to  prevent inefficient bypass and "cream skimming" of the 
incumbent operators, which would be incurred as a result of regulatory controls preventing them from 
rebalancing their pricing structure (i.e. competing operators (new entrants), are  able to undercut the 
incumbent's  tariffs  in  the  international  and  long-distance  market  sectors  without  the  incumbent 
operator being able to respond.  These sectors are attractive to  competitor's because the incumbent, 
acting on the basis of commercial principles, must maintain artificially higher prices in  those sectors in 
order to cross-subsidise its regulated below cost charges for access and local calls). 
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The  Commission  will  examine  whether  any  specific  mechanism  created  to  fund 
universal  service  operates  in  an  objective,  non-discriminatory,  transparent  and 
proportionate manner, and, in particular: 
7.  Where  a  specific  mechanism  is  considered  necessary  to  share  the  net  cost  of 
universal  service  obligations  amongst  market  players,  National  Schemes  may 
collect  and  distribute  contributions  either  via  (i)  a  universal  service  fund, 
established at a national level or (ii) via a system of  supplementary charges paid by 
undertakings interconnecting with the universal service provider. 
The  Commission  will  examine  the  scope  of organisations  which  are  required  to 
contribute  to  the  costs  associated  with  universal  service  obligations,  and,  m 
particular: 
8.  National  Schemes must identify those organisations who are required to 
contribute  to the  net  cost  of universal  service.  Contributions  may  be 
required  from  providers  of public  telecommunications  networks  and/or 
publicly available voice telephony services, but only in accordance with the 
principles of non-discrimination  and  proportionality and  in  line  with  the 
Commission's  Statement  to  the  Minutes  of  the  Council  of 
Telecommunications  Ministers  on  27  March  1996
10
.  This  means  that 
contributions  may  be  imposed  only  on  voice  telephony  providers  m 
proportion to their usage of  public telecommunications networks. 
In  the  framework  of its  assessment  of the  licensing  or  declaration 
procedure  as  regards  voice  telephony  and  the  provision  of  public 
telecommunications networks which the Member States must no later than 
1 January 1997 notify under Directive 96/19/EC, the Commission will,  in 
the case of an application/extension of obligations to new entrants and/or 
mobile operators, assess in  particular if the burden is  allocated according 
to  objective  and  non-discriminatory  criteria  and  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of proportionality.  The  Member  States  concerned  must 
therefore  sufficiently  detail  the  possible  justifications  for  such 
application/extension  in  order  to  allow  the  Commission  to  make  its 
assessment,  inter  alia  as  regards  the  degree  of substitutability  between 
mobile telephony and fixed voice telephony service. 
The Commission  will  take a  position on these financing  schemes in  the 
framework of  the formal decisions it will adopt regarding the compatibility 
of the national  declaration or licensing  schemes  notified  by  the Member 
States." 
1°  Commission Statement to the Minutes of the  1910th meetine of Council (Telecommunications), 27 
March 1996.  A Copy of this Minute Statement is set out in Ann~x  C below. 
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The  Commission  will  examine  the  method  chosen  to  identify  and  apportion  the 
contributions to  the  net cost of universal  service amongst market players,  and,  in 
particular: 
9.  National Schemes should apportion contributions amongst eligible market players 
according to their activity in the relevant market.  In order to achieve this National 
Schemes must provide procedures for identifying clearly the market upon which 
such activity  is  measured and  determine  in  a transparent  manner the  basis  for 
contribution for each eligible organisation to contribute. 
The  Commission  will  examine  the  mechanisms  for  payments  out  of National 
Schemes, and, in particular: 
lO.Payments  via  National  Schemes  must  be  made  in  a  proportionate,  non-
discriminatory  and  transparent  manner  to  organisations  subject  to  universal 
service obligations. 
4.  ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED AT A NATIONAL LEVEL 
The  assessment  of National  Schemes  will  also  necessarily  take  into  account  the 
overall  approach  in  a  Member  State  to  universal  service.  Member  States  must 
therefore assess a range of issues which, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, are 
mainly a matter of  determination at a national level. 
These issues include: 
- Whether or not obligations relating to  universal service arc specifically imposed 
on market players,  or whether market  forces  are  relied  upon  to  guarantee  the 
universal availability of an affordable service. 
- Whether or not specific pricing constraints (such as requirements for affordability; 
cost-orientation; uniform national pricing) arc imposed as part of any obligation. 
In this context the Communication on Universal Service of 13  March 1996 it was 
recognised that "affordability is at the heart of  the framework for universal service 
in  the  Community".  That  Communication  also  indicated  that "Member  States 
should ensure that appropriate measures arc taken,  (e.g.  price caps,  targeted tariff 
schemes)  necessary  to  maintain  the  affordability  of services  for  all  users, 
particularly in the run up to full competition". 
- Whether obligations arc  imposed on one or more market player and how such 
obligations are imposed (e.g. licensing I primarily legislation I time period). 
- Whether  Member  States  seek  to  franchise  universal  service  obligations  or to 
operate a pay or play system. 
Indications of  the Commission's approach to these national level issues is provided 
in Annex D. 
9 5.  GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION OF NATIONAL SCHEMES 
On the basis of  the principals set out in the legal framework identified above, this Section 
now provides detailed Guidelines for the operation of such National Schemes with a view 
to developing best practice amongst National Regulatory Authorities. 
Nationals  Schemes  should  therefore  operate  in  a  way  which  meets  the  criteria  and 
conditions  set  out  below.  These  criteria  assess  three  principal  aspects  for  National 
Schemes: 
I.  the calculation ofthe net cost ofuniversal service 
II  the mechanisms for financing universal service obligations, and 
III  the determination ofwho contributes and how costs arc shared between 
contributors. 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTUORITIES 
1.  "Nationnl  Schcmcn  may  only  relate  to  costs  nttributablc  to  the  prov1mon  of 
univcrcal ccrvicc  (i.e.  costs  attributable  to  the  provision  of  public  fixed  telephone 
networks and  publicly available fixed telephone services, as set out  in Annex I Part  1 
of the Interconnection Directive). 
The cost of universal seNic3 covers tho unavoidable net losses Incurred by an efficient 
operator in providing universal seNico to customers or groups of  customers. 
Those aro customers or groups of customers for whom tho benefits to  tho operator of 
providing them with seNice aro outweighed by the costs incurred. 
Thoroforo,  these  aro  tho  customers  that  an  operator,  acting  solely  on  commercial 
principles,  would  choose  to  disconnect if there  was  no  universal  seNice  obligation 
requiring him to provido seNico at an affordablo price.  In aroas  where the network has 
not yet been completed,  these  would bo  customers to  whom  t/10  operator would not 
offer seNico. Those "net cost" customers may be termed "non-viable". 
The  cost  of universEJI  seNico  a/so  covers  tho  provision  of public  pay phones,  of 
emergency call centres supporting emergoncy telephone numbers and the provision of 
certain special equipment of  seNices, for example, to users with disabilities. 
2.  Any calculation of the co!:t of universal service obligations must establish the 
net cost of  such obligations. 
In line with tho Full Competition Directive only the net cost of universal service 
obligations may be recovered via National Schemes. 
In line with Annex Ill of the Interconnection Directive  Nntionnl Schemes must 
comply with the following principles : 
2.1  The  net  cost  cnlculntion  mu~t be  based  on  objective,  transparent,  non-





2.2  The net cost calculation chould : 
(i)  identify  the  cotJt,  lc!iS  revenues  and  associated  benefits  of  providing 
universal service obligations to a customer or group of customers; 
Ln  the cnsn of oxjsting  cu~1QillQI11, the cost of  providing service should only include 
the incremental costs less associated revenues,  i.e.  the  net cost that the operator 




ln.JW...QB.1ill_S2f nvw Cl~QJll.Q.ffi. (whether in  an area where the network has already 
boon built or in an area whore service has yet to be extended), the same approach 
in principle should be adopted.
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In all cases a reasonable
13 return on the incremental capital employed in providing 
servico to non-viable customers should be allowed. 
I.bo \10.S.QS.fmMi..QfJn.cm.rren1£~1 rP.VffilJes and associ8E.d....benefits should include: 
connection (i.e.  a one off revenue for instalment),  rental and call revenues paid 
by customers or groups of  customers (i.e.  direct rovonuos). 
the call revenues paid by all commercially viable  customers, when calling "non-
viable"' customers (i.e.  Indirect rovonuas,  including revenues from  freephone 
services and shared cost services). 
the rop/GJccmont c:J/1 rovonuo, which should be estimated and set against  the 
incremental direct revenues that would be  lost if service were  withdrawn  from 
non-viable customers. 
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(ii)  When C<llcul<~ting net co~t n quantification of the intangible benefits of being 
a universal ccrvicc provider should be added on the benefit side. 
A  valuation  should be  placed on  the  intangible  benefits of being  the  provider of 
universal service obligations for the operator concerned. Although all the benefits of 
baing  a  universal service provider may not be  precisely quantifiable,  it should be 
possible to establish benchmark estimates for the  categories identified below,  given 
that such estimates are not uncommon in  business valuations.  Any such valuation 
must,  however,  clearly identify tho  basis for calculation and any assumptions made. 
Thoso benefits include the following: 
- Enhanced brand recognition (vis-a-vis competitors). 
A long run  appro:-~ch to identifying avoidable costs is the approach most consistent with the principle 
of  non-discrimination. 
Calculations of the expected revenue of new customers must  be  based typical  revenue  infonnation 
from existing customers in similar areas. 
A "reasonable rate of return on capital employed (ROCE)" is  the minimum rate required to continue 
attracting  necessary  funds  from  investors.  As  an  approximation,  ROCE  for  incumbent  operators, 
based on historic costs, tend to fall  in  the range of 13  to  19 percent, and when based on current costs, 
between 6 and 9 percent. 
In calculating the revenue lost an estimate should be made of the revenue that a disconnected customer 
would still generate for the operator through "replacement" calls, i.e. through the usc of the telephone 
of a relative, a friend, at work or public payphones. 
11 Universal coverage in tho area of ubiquitous operation (i.e.  comparatively lower 
costs than competitors in extending network to new customers). 
- Lifo  eye/a  vDiuo  of pcrtlcul<!r  customnrs  or groups  of customers  (Lifo  cycle 
value refers to tho feet thr:t o customer who Is uneconomic today may become 
profi/ablo in tho futuro o.g.  o "non-vlableH young family may become profitable 
to servo over time as family income begins to rise and tho children start using 
tho  pl10no).  Tills  manns  that  thoro  is  a  certain  voluo  for  an  operator  in 
providing  scrvico  to  thnt  customer  In  tho  short-tcnn  given  the  revenues 
ganamted ovor tha customer's lifetime. 
Marketing benefit of  accessing full range of  telephone usage data. 
(iii)  identify  ~cparatcly the  net CO!;t  of public  payphone~, emergency r;ervices 
and the provision of r;pccial equipment or services (e.g. to disabled users). 
The  services identified here  are  different to  the  provision  of the  basic telephone 
service  and  therefore  should  be  identified  separately  in  any cost calculation  by 
Member States.  They are specific services that the operator is required to provide 
at tariffs that do not provide, in total,  sufficient direct or associated benefits to cover 
the  total  incremental  cost  of provision.  These  services  aro  sometimes  termed 
"uneconomic  services".  They  are  the  services  that  would  not  be  provided 
according to normal commercial principles if they wore not mandated by regulation. 
In  the  case  of emergency  services,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  the 
obligation  to  provide  free  emergency  calls,  which  is  generally  placed  on  all 
operators (so that each boars its own costs) and tho obligation on one operator to 
provide an emergency call centro,  with trained staff,  to handle emergency calls at a 
national or regional/eve/.  The  net cost of such a call centro would be recoverable 
via a National Scheme for universal service. 
Public payphones may also impose a loss on the  operator,  and where  this is  the 
result of a  regulated  averaged  call price,  the  total  net incremental  cost  to  tho 
operators  of providing  payphonos  (i.e.  incremental  costs  Joss  all  associated 
revenues) may be added to tho cost of universal service. 
Where  such services are provided at prices,  which  result in  the  total incremental 
revenues  (if any)  not  covering  the  total  long-run  incremental  cost  of service 
provision, the  net cost incurred should be added to the cost of  universal service. 
2.3  National  Scheme~ ~hould calculate  costs  under  2.1  and  2.2  on  the  basis  of 
invm;tments and operating costs that could be avoided if the operator stopped 
providing !:lervico to 'non viable' customcm or groups of customers.  "Non viable" 
refem to customcm where the total direct and Indirect revenue for the op!!r<Jtor 
(calculated a~ set out at 2.2 above) is less thnn the cont of providing service to 
that customer. 
The  "avoidable  cost"  principle  followed  in  these  cost  calculations  applies  both  to 
operating costs and fixed costs associated with capital equipment.  Where  there 
are sunk investments (i.e.  investments which once made cannot be fully recovered)  that 
could have been avoided but for tho  universal service obligation,  an  appropriate rata of 




The  value  taken  for  any fixed  investments  should  not  be  tho  one  appearing  in  tho 




2.4  Thn nctunl procc:m of quantifying univcmal service costs in any Member State is 
likely to require nn m;scssment of likely net cost areas, which may be explained 
by a number of factors, such as, the social/economic maim up of subscribers, tho 
density of subscribers and the topography of tho landscape. 
The  methodology proposed under 2.2 and 2.3 above,  will also account for the  net cost 
of  serving "non-viable' customers in so called high cost areas.  No additional calculation 
for high  cost areas is  pormitted,  where  this  results  in  double  counting of the  cost of 
snrving  "non-viable" customers. 
2.5  National Schemes should only rclntc to tho financing of tho net cost of universal 
service obligations  in  respect of which tho  operator,  subject to that universal 
service  obligation,  has  explicitly  declared  that he  is  only  able  to  provide  the 
service  at a not cost to himself. 
Such  a declaration  should be  made  to  the  National Regulatory Authority and should 
irlC'ntify  those  customers or groups of customer or those  services which  the  operator 
concerned  would  not  serve,  but for  universal  service  obligations,  or in  the  case  of 
provision to new customers or in new areas, will not be prepared to serve on request. 
3.  In lin!:!  with the Full Competition Directive, National Schemes for calculating tho 
cost  of  univcrsnl  service  obligations  may  not  Include  an  'access  deficit 
contribution' nttributablc to unbalanced national tariff !itructurcs. 
Traditionally,  operators have often ensured cheap connection,  rentals  (and sometimes 
local calls)  by cross-subsidies from  long distance and international call revenues.  This 
has often meant that the connection charge and the access line rental does not result in 
a roasonable rate of return on the capital employed by those operators in providing that 
access  .. 
Where  an  operator,  which  does  not  face  competition,  has  an  "access  deficit",  the 
operator is typically compensated by very high profits generated by other services such 
as international and long distance calls.  Wl7ere this situation exists,  the operator's tariffs 
nre "out of  balance" with the costs it incurs
16
.  In a competitive marketplace an operator 
should not be forced to maintain such tariff  imbalances. 
4.  Nntionnl  Scheme~ notified to the  Commi55ion  must include a timetable for tho 
future  pha~lng out of remaining tnrin imbalances.  Such rebalancing should be 
completed, nt the latent, by 1 Jammry 2000, except in the case of those Member 
Stnt~s who hnvc been  granted <tn  ndditional implcmentntion period pumuant to 
Article  1(2)  of the  Full  Competition  Directive.  In  such  cases  tho  date for the 
The governing principle  is  that  competitors  should  only  be required  to  pay  for  universal  service 
provision according to the minimum cost of  an efficient operator providing that service to-day.  At the 
same time,  account should be  taken  in  identifying those costs of any  regulatory restrictions  which 
would prevent tlw  universal service provider from  using the most efficient technology (for example, 
restrictions placed on incumbent network operators from  using wireless solutions in  rural or remote 
areas). 
Unbalanced tariffs,  or its  corollary,  an  access  deficit,  do  not equate  to  a  genuine 'net loss'  for the 
opw:tor as the operator is  usually compensated by the large profits from other activities, such as long 
distance and international calls.  Indeed,  it  is  likely that most customers receiving subsidised access 
will still be profitable for the operator to serve, based on the incremental revenues that are attributable 
to them.  Those customers who impose a  net cost on the operator will be captured in  the net cost 
exercise described in section 2.2 above. 
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completion  of such  rcb:~l:mcinfJ Zh:!ll  be  the  date  upon  which  that additional 
implementation period end!:. 
5.  Whore it hm>  not bo pocclblo to complete the rebalancing of tariffs bY,  1 January 
1993, Member Stntc~ may, in line with tho Full Competition Directive 
7
,  establish 
mcchanl~mc ~opr~mto from  fJntion~l Schemm;  for universal service to prevent 
new entrants from unfnirly t;,!dng ndvantagc of the structure of prices (i.e.  high 
charges  for  international  nnd  long-distance  ocrvicc~  which  arc  not  oriented 
towards cost) created by the rcgul<:~tion of tho Incumbent operator's prices. 
Such mcchani!>m5 must be  bnsed on objective, transparent, non-dincrlmlnatory 
and proportionate procodurcn nnd criteria. 
Tho principles for such access deficit schemes arc discussed further in Annex  B. 
G.  No  account  may  be  tnltcn  in  cnlculating  the  net  cost  of  univcroal  service 
obllgntion~ which arc outside the scope of universal service, for example: 
G.1  tho  CO!;t  of lmpl:!monting  npccific  measures  required  for  purposes  of public 
security; 
6.2  the provision of communication services outside the scope of universal service 
to schools, hospitals or libraries; 
6.3  compom:;ation  nnd/or  refund  pnyments  (or  administrative  and  other  costs 
associated  with such  p::~ymcnts) mndo to users m;  a  result of failure  to meet 
specified ~:>ervice quality level!;; 
6.4  the cor:t of replacement and/or upgrnding of telecommunications equipment in 
tho coume of normal notworlc modcrnination; 
7.  No  account  may  be  tnlccn  in  cnlculating  the  net  cost  of  universal  service 
obligntions of the co!>t of itcmi~cd billing, and other facilitins (e.g. selective call 
barring  nnd  calling-line  idontific;1tion)  where  such  facilities  arc  imposed  as 
obligations to all voice telephony operator::.. 
a.  Mechanisms for fimmclng univcrcal ncrvicc obligations within National Schemes 
must bo  based  on  objective, tr<1ncparcnt,  non-discriminatory and  proportionate 
criteria  and  procedures.  This  includes  situations  where  a  specific  financing 
mechanism is not set up or where the State funds directly or Indirectly the cost of 
some or all clemente of univcrcal smvicc. 
9.  In  line  with  tho  Full  Competition  and  Interconnection  Directives,  National 
Schemm; may provido n mcchnnism for !::h;:ning any unfair burden resulting from 
the  net  costs  nssocint~d with  tho  provision  of universal  nervicc  obligations 
amongst other mmltet player!>. 
10.  Such  mechanisms  within  t.Jntionnl  Schemes  may  talm  the  form  of  either  a 
univcmal  service  fund  c~t~blbhcd  at  a  national  level  or  a  system  of 
supplementary charges. 
See in particular Recital 20 of the Full Competition Directive. 
14 Ttle rules for cu!culation of  tho net cost of universal service, set out above, are the same 
for i.Joth  financing  mechanisms.  Only the  collection of universal service contributions 
from the relovant mDrkot players is different under the two schemes. 
11.  National Sclwmas mny combine clement!:> of both mechanisms in order to ensure 
th<lt  any  unfair  burden  associntcd  with  the  net  costs  of  universal  service 
otlig<1iions arc shnrcd fairly nmong:;t marlmt plnyem, providing that there Is no 
unt!uo tliscrimin«tion, and thnt no orgnninntion ir. required directly or Indirectly to 
conlr:butc.;  rnoro  than once  in  respect of the  net cost of a  particular universal 
sctvlce obligation. 
12.1  Where  National  £chemcs  incorporate  n  Univcrnnl  Service  Fund,  the  body 
a~mln!:;toring thnt fund should meet tho following criteria: 
a)  1he fund shall be ndminir.tcrm.l by a body independent of the contributing 
and recipient umlcrtnldng(n). 
b)  That body nhall be responsible for collecting contributionn from operators 
and r.;crvicc provir!cru who arc llnblc to contribute to the cost of universal 
smvicc oblig<>tions  in thnt Member Stnto and will ovcmee the transfer of 
sums  due  and/or  administrate  out-p::~ymcnts  to  the  pcmons  and/or 
organi~ntionr; entitled to receive p::~ym~nt~ from the Fund. 
In  administering  the  financial  arrangements  for  universal  service,  National 
Schemes  should seek to  minimise  tho  administrative  burden  imposed and the 
resulting costs.  For that reason,  the  body administering a Fund may act as an 
"auditor" and  "clearing  house" for payments or may simply oversee payments 
directly between the organisations concerned. 
c)  Tho rcsponcibility for verifying tlw net cost of univer~nl ~crvice obligations 
~;llould rcmnin \•Jith the rclnv<~nt N~tionnl  Rcgul<~tory Authority. 
12.2  Out payment~  from thu fund to the orgnnisntiom:; incurring a net cost attributable 
to universal ccrvicc obligations mm::t  b:")  mnt~0 nccording to proportionate, non-
discriminatory ~nd tmnsp:ucnt crilcri<~. 
13.1  National Schemes providing for n Gy:::tcm of :::uppbmcntnry charges  must ensure 
that the  opcrntor(!:>)  concerned  tlotcrminc(c)  the  net  cost of univemal  service 
oblig<>tion, an  \"JOII  <~n tho npccific contribution~ to ba collnctcd vin the system of 
supp!rmwnt:uy  chnrgr.:~; in nn inmsp;:;r;.mt, non-dbcriminatory nnd proportionate 
rn<1nncr and eu!Jjcct to review !Jy thn NJtionnl Rcgui<Jtory Authority. 
Nntionnl Scheme:> chould cn::::urc, in p::~rticular, thnt there 1:;  no conflict of interest 
between nn OfHlrator'c commcrci~l nctiviticc nnd itc role in collecting in-payments 
from its compctitom. 
Any contri!Jution to be paid via a system of  supplementary charges should be calculated 
annually  and  bused  on  an  annual  calculation  of  tho  cost  of  universal  service 
obligations. 
10 
13.2  The  cum  due  chould  br:  collected  within  n  rcm;onable  time  period  from  the 
organi!;<Jtionc concerned.  The pnymcnt may be  collected as a one off payment 
18  See Article 5(5) of Interconnection Directive. 
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on an  nnnu~l bani!; or nt uny othl)r frequency determined by tho relevant National 
Rcgul:ltory Authority. 
13.3  National Scheme:; muzt en~urc  the tmnnparency of any syntem of supplementary 
chargen. 
This  requires  the  unbundling of tmffic charges  for interconnection  from  any identified 
contribution to  the cost of universal service.  In  addition,  the  universal service provider 
should itself indicate  separately tho  extent of its  own  contributions toward the  cost of 
universal service. 
14  In line with the Full Competition Directive and the Interconnection Directive, only 
organisations providing public tclccommunicntions nctworlts and/or public voice 
telephony  service~ mny be required under National Schemes to contribute to a 
Univcm~l  Service  Fund  or  to  ;:my  system  of  supplementary  charges.  Any 
requirement for contribution munt however be in accordance with the principles 
of non-discrimination  and  proportionality  and  in  line  with  the  Commim>ion's 
Stntcmnnt on this izsuo at the Council of Telccommunicationn rmninters in March 
199o  (Sec  Annex D).  This  mcnns that contributions mny  only be  imposed on 
voice  telephony  providcffi  in  proportion  to  their  usage  of  public 
telecommunications nctworl(s. 
In the fmmework of its assessment of the licensing or declaration procedure as regards 
voice  telephony  and  the  provision  of public  telecommunications  networks  which  the 
Member States must no later than  1 January 1997 notify under Directive 96/19/EC, the 
Commission will,  in  the case of <m  application (extension) of obligations to new entrants 
and/or mobile  operators,  assess  in  particular  if the  burden  is  allocated  according  to 
objective  and  non-discriminntory  criteria  and  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
proportionality.  The  Member States concerned  must therefore  sufficiently  detail  the 
possible justifications for such  8pplic::~tion/extension in order to allow the Commission to 
make its assessment, inter alia as regards the degree of substitutability between mobile 
telephony and fixed voice telephony service. 
The  Commission will take a position on these financing schemes in the framework of  the 
formal decisions it will adopt regarding  the  compatibility of the  national doclamtion  or 
licensing schemes notified by the Member States." 
15.  Examples  of  orgnni:-;ntions  which  are  rutl  liable  to  contribute  to  fimmcing 
univcmnl  service  include  (i)  private  nctworl<  operators  offering  corporntc 
net\.vorldng  or clo::;ed  user· group services),  (ii)  service  providers offering data 
communications or value-added dnta services, (such as  c-mnil), and (iii) service 
providcro  offering  enlt~nced  voice  telephony  scrvicon 
10  such  as  vidco-
conferencing,  voice  mail  ~crvicc~,  and  voice  enquiry/reply  services  such  as 
homc-banlting or tole-shopping,. 
The scopn of tho contribution b~sc for universal service may evolvo over time in 
line with changes in technology <1nd marl<ct structure. 
With regard to the provision of voice telephony service via the Internet, this  is not currently viewed as 
a publicly available voice telephony service. (see Commission Notice [  .. ] regarding the status of voice 
on the Voice on the Internet under Directive 90/388/EEC).  Contributions cannot therefore be required 
today from  Internet Access  Providers,  though  organisations providing  Internet access  via their own 
network would normally have contributed on the basis of their operation of a public network. 
16 1  G.  N<ltlonal  Schemm>  nhould  npportlon  contributions  nmongnt  ollglblo  marlwt 
playcm according to their activity in the relevnnt marlmt.  In order to nchieve this 
Nntionnl Schemes ghould provide procedures for identifying clearly the mnrlwt 
upon which such activity is mcmmrcd and determine in a transparent manner the 
basil:; for contribution for each eligible organination to contribute. 
17.  Ni"ltionnl Schemes must ensure that the level of contribution required from the 
eligible  organisntions  Identified  at  14  above  in  calculated  in  an  objective, 
transpnrent, non-discriminatory and  proportionate manner.  In  order to ensure 
thi5, National Schemes should comply with the following principles: 
17.1.  In  line  with  the  principle  of subsidiarity,  Member  States  may  determine  the 
r;pccific critorin within National Schemes for apportioning contributions amongst 
eligible  mnrkct  players,  providing  such  criteria  meet  the  requirements  of 
paragraph 16 above. 
17.2  Nntlonnl Schemes should ennurc thnt tho apportionment of contributions docs 
not unduly dbtort investment incentivcc and economic efficiency. 
17.3  Nationnl Schemes uhould ensure that tho  criteria  chosen  to determine mnrlwt 
sharo of cllgiblo org;:micntions does not have a disproportionate or dh;criminatory 
effect on particular players. 
A  number  of indicators,  such  as  revenues  before  tax;  call  minutes,  number  of 
subscribers  and  overall  profit,  might  be  used  to  measure  the  activity  of eligible 
organisations.  Nevertheless,  whatever  method  is  chosen  should  operate  in  a 
proportionate,  non-discriminatory  and  transparent  manner,  and  should  encourage 
competition  whilst  avoiding  unjustified  administrative  or accounting  burdens  of the 
players concerned.  For example,  Member States  should avoid criteria  which  unduly 
distort patterns of  market entry, activity or investment by market players. 
17.4  Nntional Schemes nhould ensure that the colloction mcchnnism prevents "double 
contributions". 
One  example  of a  double  contribution  would be  where  a service  provider,  providing 
service  via  leased lines  is  required  to  contribute  directly to  a  universal  service  fund 
according to his activity level (e.g.  gross revenues),  even though the tariff for the leased 
lines  has been  set by the  network opemtor to  recover that operators  contribution  to 
universal service  as  a  provider of a public  telecommunications  network.  In  such  a 
situation  th'J  direct  and  indirect  contribution  would  incur  duplicate  payment  of that 
Service Provider towards the cost of  universal service obligations. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This Communication has identified the criteria which the Commission will use in 
assessing  the  costing  and  financing  aspects  of National  Schemes  for  universal 
service  which  must  notified  to  the  Commission  in  line  with  the  deadlines 
established in the Full Competition Directive. 
The Commission intends to review such notified schemes in the first half of 1997 
in order to allow Member States to take any necessary steps to adapt such schemes 
to the requirements of  Community law in good time to permit the full liberalisation 
of  the telecommunications market by 1 January 1998. 
17 In  the  light of its  experience  in  assessing the  schemes notified to  it,  and of the 
results  of an  important  study  of the  practical  aspects  of costing  and  funding 
universal service in  a competitive environment, the  Commission  intends to  draw 
conclusions in the form of practical guidelines for the telecommunications industry, 
for regulators and for users, to develop best practice with the Community. 
This Communication is now submitted to the Member States to assist them as they 
finalise their National Schemes. 
18 ANNEX A :  RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW RELATING 
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......  ' . . . . ..  .....  .......  . ..................  ,  . ..  .....  .  ··:~a ... ,  ..... ,  .. 
··  ·.  AJ:ticlc4C of.full (;ornpctitionpirectivci  < · 
Without prejudice to  the  harmonization by  the European  Parliament and  the Council in 
the framework of ONP, any national scheme which is necessary to share the net cost of 
the  provision  of  universal  service  obligations  entrusted  to  the  telecommunications 
organizations, with other organizations whether it consists of a system of supplementary 
charges or a universal service fund, shall, 
(a)  apply only to undertakings providing public telecommunications networks; 
(b)  allocate  the  respective  burden  to  each  undertaking  according  to  objective  and 
non-discriminatory criteria and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
Member States shall communicate any  such scheme to  the Commission so that it can 
verify the scheme's compatibility with the Treaty. 
Member States shall allow their telecommunications organizations to  re-balance tariffs 
taking account of specific market conditions and  of the  need  to ensure the affordability 
of a  universal  service,  and,  in  particular,  Member  States  shall  allow  them  to  adapt 
current rates which are not in  line with costs and which increase the burden of universal 
service  provision,  in  order  to  achieve  tariffs  based  on  real  costs.  Where  such 
rebalancing cannot be completed before 1 January 1998 the Member States concerned 
shall  report  to  the  Commission  on  the  future  phasing  out  of  the  remaining  tariff 
imbalances. This shall include a detailed time-table for implementation. 
In any case, within three months after the European Parliament and the Council adopt a 
directive harmonizing  interconnection  conditions,  the  Commission  will  assess whether 
further initiatives are  necessary to  ensure  the  consistency of both  directives and  take 
the appropriate measures. 
In  addition,  the Commission shall,  no  later than  1 January 2003,  review the  situation  in 
the Member States and  assess in  particular whether the financing  schemes in  place do 
not limit access  to  the  relevant  markets.  In  this  case,  the  Commission  will  examine 
whether there are other methods and make any appropriate proposals. 
Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of 13  March  19%  amending  Commission  Directive  <J0/3!\R/EEC 
regarding  the  implementation  of  full  competition  in  telecommunications  markets  ("the  full 
Competition Directive"). 
19 21 
(g)  "universal service" means a defined minimum set of services of specified quality which 
is available to  all  users  independent of their geographical  location  and,  in  the  light of 
specific national conditions, at an affordable price. 
Interconnection and universal service contributions 
1.  Where  a Member State determines,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of this  Article, 
that universal service obligations represent a unfair burden  on  an  organization,  it  may 
establish mechanisms for sharing the net cost of the universal service obligations with 
other  organizations  operating  public  telecommunications  networks  and/or  publicly 
available  voice  telephony  services.  Member  States  shall  take  due  account  of. the 
principles  of  transparency,  non-discrimination  and  proportionality  in  setting  the 
contributions  to  be  made.  Only  public  telecommunications  networks  and  publicly 
available telecommunications services as  set out in  Part 1 of Annex I may  be financed 
in this way. 
2.  Contributions  to  the  cost  of universal  service  obligations  if any  may  be  based  on  a 
mechanism  specifically  established  for  the  purpose  and  administered  by  a  body 
independent of the beneficiaries, and/or may  take the form of a supplementary charge 
added to the interconnection charge. 
3.  In order to determine the burden if any which the provision of universal service represents, 
organizations  with  universal  service  obligations  shall,  at the  request  of their  national 
regulatory  authority,  calculate  the  net  cost  of such  obligations  in  accordance  with 
Annex Ill.  The  calculation  of  the  net  cost  of  universal  service  obligations  shall  be 
audited by the national regulatory authority or another competent body,  independent of 
the telecommunications organization, and approved by the national regulatory authority. 
The results of the cost calculation and the conclusions of the audit shall be open to the 
public in accordance with Article 14(2). 
4.  Where justified on  the  basis of the net cost calculation  referred  to  in  paragraph  3,  and 
taking into account the market benefit if any which accrues to an organization that offers 
universal service,  national regulatory authorities shall determine whether a mechanism 
for sharing the net cost of universal service obligations is justified. 
5.  Where the  mechanisms referred  to  in  paragraph 4 are established,  national  regulatory 
authorities  shall  ensure  that  the  principles  for  cost  sharing,  and  details  of  the 
mechanism used, are open to the public in accordance with Article 14(2). 
COMMON  POSITION  (EC)  No 34/96  adopted by  the  Council on  18  June  1996  with  a  view  to 
adopting Directive 96/  ... IEC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of ... on interconnection in 
telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application 
of  the principles of  open network provision (ONP). 
20 National regulatory authorities shall ensure that an annual report is published giving the 
calculated cost of universal service obligations,  and  identifying the contributions made 
by all the parties involved. 
6.  Until  such  time  as  the  procedure described  in  paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 is  implemented, 
any  charges  payable  by  an  interconnected  party  which  include  or  serve  as  a 
contribution to  the  cost of universal  service obligations  shall  be  notified,  prior to  their 
introduction, to the national regulatory authority. Where the national regulatory authority 
finds on  its  own  initiative,  or after a substantiated  request  by  an  interested  party,  that 
such charges are excessive, the organization concerned shall be required to reduce the 
relevant  charges.  Such  reductions  shall  be  applied  retrospectively,  from  the  date  of 
introduction of the charges, but not before 1 January 1998. 
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The fixed public telephone network 
The  fixed  public  telephone  network  means  the  public  switched  telecommunications 
network  which  supports  the  transfer  between  network  termination  points  at  fixed 
locations of speech and 3,1  kHz bandwidth audio information, to support inter alia: 
voice telephony; 
facsimile Group Ill communications, in accordance with ITU-T Recommendations 
in the "T  -series"; 
voice  band  data  transmission  via  modems  at a  rate  of at  least 2 400  bitls,  in 
accordance with ITU-T Recommendations in the "V-series". 
Access to  the  end-user's network termination  point is via  a number or numbers in  the 
national numbering plan. 
The  fixed  public  telephone  service  according  to  Directive  95/62/EC  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application 
of  open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony f
2
) 
The fixed public telephone service means the provision to end-users at fixed locations of 
a service for the originating and receiving  of national and  international calls,  and  may 
include  access  to  emergency  (112)  services,  the  provision  of  operator  assistance, 
directory  services,  provision  of public  pay  phones,  provision  of service  under special 
terms and/or provision of special facilities for customers with disabilities or with special 
social needs. 
Access to the end-user is via a number or numbers in the national numbering plan. 
2'  - OJ  No L. 321,30.12.1995, p.6. 
21 CALCULATING THE COST OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS FOR 
VOICE TELEPHONY 
Referred to in Article 5(3) 
Universal  service  obligations  refer  to  those  obligations  placed  upon  an  organization  by  a 
Member State which  concern the  provision  of a network and  service throughout a specified 
geographical area,  including - where required - averaged prices in that geographical area for 
the provision of that service. 
The cost of universal service obligations shall be calculated as the difference between the net 
cost  for  an  organization  of operating  with  the  universal  service  obligations  and  operating 
without the universal service obligations. 
This  applies whether the  network  in  a particular Member State  is  fully  developed  or  is  still 
undergoing development and expansion. 
The calculation shall be based upon the costs attributable to: 
(i)  elements of the  identified  services which  can  only  be  provided  at a loss  or provided 
under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards. 
This category  may  include service elements such  as  access to  emergency telephone 
services,  provision  of certain  public  pay  telephones,  provision  of certain  services  or 
equipment for disabled people, etc. 
(ii)  specific end-users or groups of end-users who, taking into account the cost of providing 
the  specified  network  and  service,  the  revenue  generated  and  any  geographical 
averaging of prices imposed by the Member State, can only be served at a loss or under 
cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards. 
This  category  includes  those  end-users  or groups  of end-users  which  would  not  be 
served by a commercial operator which did  not have an  obligation to  provide universal 
service. 
In  peripheral  regions with  expanding  networks,  the  cost calculation  should  be  based  on  the 
additional cost of serving those end-users or groups of end-users which an  operator applying 
the normal commercial principles of a competitive environment would choose not to serve. 
Revenues shall be taken into account in calculating the net costs.  Costs and revenues should 
be forward-looking. 
22 ANNEX B:  ACCESS DEFICIT CONTRIBUTION SCHEMES. 
Assessment Criteria to Access Deficit Schemes 
As indicated in the Assessment Criteria for National Schemes above, Member 
States may establish separate mechanisms which address the effects resulting 
for an incumbent operator of regulatory constraints on its tariff structure, i.e. 
controls on the speed with which it  can rebalance its tariffs in order to  meet 
the requirement for rebalancing in the Full Competition Directive. 
Such schemes should be separate from  the National Scheme for costing and 
financing the net cost of  universal service obligations in a Member State. 
Such schemes should be based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory 
and proportionate  procedures  and  criteria and  should  only  be  created  on a 
temporary basis. 
In  order  to  meet  these  conditions  such  schemes  should  comply  with  the 
principles set out below: 
1.  After I  January  1998, the operators concerned retain 8Bnificant cross-
subsidies for  residential  access going beyond what would be expected 
according  to  normal  commercial  practices,  (i.e.  such  operators  arc 
subject  to  regulatory  constraints  which  have  prevented  them  from 
completing  the  process  of tariff rebalancing  and  this  has  resulted  in 
tariff structures  which  arc  substantially  out  of line  with  the  capital 
invested in providing local access). 
2.  Access Deficit Schemes should be  implemented only on a  temporary 
basis and only until 1 January 2000. 
In principle, access deficit schemes take the retail price structure (or the 
profitability of the  various  business  areas)  of the  incumbent  as  the 
starting point for  calculating the  interconnection price,  and allow  a 
discount  on  these  prices  to  give  the  price  for  interconnect  for  a 
particular type ofca/1 or service.  The calculation is therefore top down, 
rather than a bottom up approach based on the actual costs incurred. 
As a result any access deficit scheme will prevent effective competition 
from  becoming cstahlislzed as competitors  (cntrant.'J~ ·will  he forced to 
charge  higher  prices  for  those  services,  which  contribute  to  the 
incumbent's access deficit.  This  type of  interconnection pricing regime 
undermines the incentives for the incumbent to orient its prices towards 
cost.  These effects distort investments within the industry and  can only 
be considered as a temporwy exception to the Treaty competition rules. 
3.  Any Access Deficit Scheme  should require  the  clear identification of 
any "deficit" claimed, calculated in a proportionate, non-discriminatory 
and  transparent  manner.  The  calculation  should  be  subject  to 
independent verification.  The calculation should identify the allocation 
of the capital employed to  provide access, together with any common 
23 and joint costs which should be allocated according to the principles of 
proportionality and non-discrimination. 
4.  Safeguards to ensure the transparency of any Access Deficit Scheme are 
of particular importance, given the considerable discretion available to 
an incumbent operator with regard to the allocation of common 1  joint 
costs within its business.  Access Deficit Schemes should not be used in 
a  way  which  simply  finances  inefficiencies  within  an  incumbent 
operator's activities. 
5.  Information concerning the implementation of such schemes, as well as 
the timetable for their phasing out should be notified to the Commission 
alongsi~~ !he notification ofNational Schemes for universal service (i.e. 
~  ...  1QQ(, 
by 11  January 19lJ t  1 J, -'· 
In  the  absence  of such  information  it  will  not  be  possible for  the 
Commission to  assess the  compatibility of  National Schemes with the 
EC Treaty. 
6.  Any  Access  Deficit Scheme should be  structurally  separate from  any 
National Scheme for Universal Service. 
The  purpose of an access deficit scheme  is  to  address  the  effects,  of 
inefficient  bypass  and  cream  skimming,  created  by  regulatory 
constraints on the incumbent's tariff  structure.  The  "deficit" does not 
represent a genuine loss for the operator concerned.  It is not therefore 
part of  the net cost of  providing elements of  universal service. 
7.  National Regulatory Authorities should ensure that other market players 
only contribute to  any  access  deficit where  the  competitor uses  some 
part of the network (i.e.  interconnects) of the  incumbent to  transmit a 
call. 
If the  competitor is  able  to  offer to  customers an end to  end service 
which  does  not  use  or  interconnect  to  the  incumbent's  network,  no 
access deficit contribution should be payable. 
8.  Access  deficit  contributions  should  be  calculated  on the  basis of the 
contribution  to  the  access  deficit  that  the  incumbent  loses  when  the 
revenue (tariff) that would have gone to the incumbent, is instead paid 
to  a  competitor,  even though  the  call  was  transported  partly  via  the 
incumbent's network
23
•  The access deficit contribution will be less than 
the full contribution to the access deficit that the incumbent would have 
earned  had  it  transported  the  entire  call,  because  of the  effects  of 
competition in expanding the  market.  A portion of the  interconnected 
traffic  should  be  considered  new  traffic  for  which  there  can  be  no 
contribution foregone by the incumbent. 
23  Where no interconnection takes place, no contribution to the access deficit should be made. 
24 ANNEX C :  COMMISSION  STATEMENT  TO  THE  MINUTES  OF  THE 
t910TH  MEETING  OF  COUNCIL  (TELECOMMUNICATIONS) 
ON  27TH  MARCH  1996  ON  WHO  CONTRIBUTES  TO 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
"In  relation  to  Article  5(1)  of the  common  position  on  the  proposal  for  a 
Directive on interconnection in  telecommunications, the  Commission recalls 
that  Article  4c  of  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of  13  March  1996 
amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  regarding  the  implementation  of  full 
competition in telecommunications markets states that, where Member States 
set up mechanisms for  sharing the net cost of universal service obligations, 
they  should  apply  these  mechanisms  to  undertakings  providing  public 
telecommunications networks.  The Directive further states that the respective 
burden  must  be  allocated  according  to  obj!!Gtive  and  no~ liiscriminatory 
criteria and in accordance with the principle of pr~;,vrtionality.  According to 
the  latter principle contributions  shGula,  as  emphasised in recital  19  of the 
Commission Directive, seek only to ensure that market participants contribute 
to the financing of universal service. The Commission notes that Parliament 
and Council Directive 95/62/EC on the application of  ONP to voice telephony 
defines  the  scope  of universal  service  obligations,  which  burden  may  be 
financed through universal service mechanisms. Furthermore, the principle of 
non discrimination opposes  financing  mechanisms for the  universal  service 
obligations which lead either to double contributions to the cost of universal 
service  in  the  same  Member  State  or  to  all  undertakings  in  the 
telecommunications  markets  subsidising  the  voice  telephony  operators. 
Consequently contributions should be limited to services within the scope of 
the universal service definition. 
The Commission will therefore interpret both Article 4c of the Commission 
Directive and 5(1) of this common position as allowing contributions only to 
be imposed on voice telephony providers in proportion to their usage of  public 
telecommunications networks." 
25 ANNEX D:  ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SCHEMES ADDRESSED 
MAINLY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
24 
Even though the needs of  the internal market and aim of ensuring a high standard of 
consumer protection mean that a common concept of universal service is required at 
a Community level, many of its aspects arc closely linked to the specific situation in 
each Member State.  As a result considerable day to day responsibility is placed on 
National  Regulatory  Authorities,  for  example,  to  determine  what  is  "affordable" 
service in a particular Member State. 
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, a range of issues will be  addressed mainly 
at a national level concerning the management of the universal service obligations. 
These approaches create the overall framework within which National Schemes will 
operate. National approaches in these areas must remain consistent with Community 
law,  and  in  particular,  must  be  proportional,  non-discriminatory,  transparent  and 
based on objective criteria and procedures.  Whilst such issues arc not the primary 
focus  of  this  Communication,  the  Commission  will  necessarily  examine  the 
approach chosen in order to assess properly the National Schemes submitted to it. 
The need for specific obligations to he imposed to guarantee universal service 
The first  issue is whether there is  a  need for specific obligations placed on 
certain operators to provide universal service, or whether voluntary usc by 
operators of special and/or customer targeted tariff schemes is achieving the 
overall aim of ensuring affordable service. 
The  principle of proportionality  means  that  obligations  should  be  imposed  in 
relation to universal service only where there is  a risk that the goal of ensuring 
affordable access to a defined level of universal service throughout a given area 
cannot be achieved in a competitive environment without the creation of specific 
mechanisms  to  share  fairly  amongst  market  players  any  identified  costs 
attributable  to  those  obligations  which  the  universal  service  provider(s)  has 
(have) incurred. 
Pricing decisions as part of universal service obligations 
A second issue is the decision on pricing policies (e.g. national choices to apply 
a  uniform  national  tariff  or  to  allow  some  degree  of tariff  dcaveraging  I 
determination  of affordability  I  usc  of mechanisms  to  control  the  speed  of 
rebalancing). 
Community policy with regard to  pricing is confined to specific obligations for 
cost-orientation  of  the  tariffs  for  certain  services  (e.g.  Leased  lines, 
· Interconnection charges)  and  an  obligation of affordability  with regard  to  the 
delivery  of universal  scrvice
24
•  Community  policy  docs  not  require  nor 
prevent decisions  at  a  national  level,  for  example,  to  maintain  uniform 
See COM(96) 419 of 11  September 1996, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on  universal service for 
telecommunications  in  a  competitive  environment  (replacing  European  parliament  and  Council 
Directive 95/62/EC). 
26 national prices or to allow deaveraging, providing the overall affordability of 
the service is not called into question. 
At the same time, in the Communication on Universal Service the Commission 
made  clear  that  u~reater  [tar(f!J  flexibility  must  be  conditional  upon  the 
rc~ulatmy  fi'mnework (i)  includin~ adequate measures to  ensure C{{{ordability  ; 
cnsurin~ that price increases for users  in  remote  and rural areas,  other than 
(l(!justments  to  achieve  cost-orientation,  arc  not used to  compensate operators 
for losses in revenue  resultin~.fl·om price decreases elsewhere and (iii)  ensurin~ 
that any d(flerenccs in pricin~ between hi~h cost areas am/low cost areas do not 
endanger the qffordability (?funiversal service". 
The organisation of the universal service obligation at a national level 
Once that  decision  is  taken to  entrust universal  service provision  to  one or more 
organisations,  National  Regulatory  Authorities  are  likely  to  decide  a  range  of 
additional issues which impact the operation ofNational Schemes: 
Whether  there  will  be  one  or  multiple  providers  with  universal  service 
obligations in a Member State or particular areas within a Member State; 
Whether universal obligations will  be imposed by geographical areas (e.g.  the 
whole territory  or by  region)  or by service category  (e.g.  provision of public 
voice telephony; provision of  payphoncs); 
Procedures for  imposing universal  service obligations (e.g.  imposition through 
regulatory instruments I usc of tendering procedures I time scale for  review of 
obligations); 
Administrative aspects (e.g. structure and management of universal service fund 
I payment mechanisms for  universal  service (e.g.  out of a  fund  I direct  State 
funding  I  user  of vouchers  to  pay  subsidies  directly  to  needy  customers  I 
valuation or  contributions in kind). 
Universal Servicr contributions through 'Pay or Play' schemes 
A  key  issue  to  be  addressed  is  the  basic choice as  to  who will  provide  universal 
service and how that or those provider(s) will be selected.  Once again, provided the 
general  principles  of  objectivity,  proportionality,  non-discrimination  and 
transparency arc observed, this decision is principally an issue of subsidiarity. 
At the  same  time,  there  should  not be  an  automatic  assumption  that  the  current 
universal service provider must continue to provide universal service or be the only 
provider, or equally that universal service should be maintained as a single bundled 
offering.  It will  remain  important  within  any  scheme  to  ensure  that  adequate 
incentives arc provided to encourage cost-efficient delivery of  universal service. This 
will  limit  the  possible  distortive  effects  on  market  entry  and  investments  which 
higher than necessary universal service costs may have. 
One means of achieving this may be to  place clements of universal service out to 
tender on either a  geographical  basis or for  specific service clements, such as the 
provision of public  payphoncs.  This  would  allow competitors  to  bid  to  provide 
clements of universal  service of equal  or improved  quality,  with  the  tender being 
27 awarded to  the  organisation offering to  provide service of specified quality at the 
lowest level of subsidy.  In the event that no bid to provide service, the NRA would 
retain a residual power to impose universal service obligations. 
Another means would be to  invite for tenders among competitors, as above, but on 
franchising terms (i.e.  specified service,  quality  and  end-user prices) awarding the 
universal service provision obligation to the service provider asking for least subsidy 
to provide the universal service clement in an uneconomic area. This approach may 
be particularly important in those Member States where the process of network build 
out has not yet been fully completed to all areas. 
Closely linked to this issue of franchising is the relationship between those providing 
universal  service  and those  contributing  to  its  cost.  In  general,  those  providing 
elements of universal service should be  able to offset the net cost of such provision 
against contributions which they  would  otherwise  be  required  to  make  through a 
financing  mechanism.  A  valuation  of that  cost  should  take  into  account  the 
marketing  and  commercial  benefits  which  may  be  seen  to  accrue  from  being  a 
universal service provider.  This is often termed a "pay or play" approach, though in 
reality, it is more likely to be "pay and play". 
28 TECHNICAL GLOSSARY 
Accoss Capital 
Accoss Doficit 




High Cost Aroa 
lncromontal Capital Employod 
lncromontal Cost 
lncromontal Revenue 
Llno Rontal Chargo 
Long-run A voidab/o Cost 
Long-run lncromontal Cost 
Non-v/ablo Customor 
This  is  the  capital  employed  to  provide  customer  local 
access to the public telephone network. 
"Access deficit" refers to  the case where the revenues an 
operator earns from connection and  rental charges do not 
provide  it  with  a  reasonable  rate  of  return  on  capital 
employed in providing access. 
Similar concept to incremental cost,  except that instead of 
the  cost  relating  to  an  "outward"  increment  in  output the 
focus is on the cost that can be 'avoided' by a decrement in 
output. 
The assets attributed to the provision of a particular service 
or sector(e.g.  local  access,  international  calls,  pay-phone 
service, etc.). 
The  one-off  price  charged  to  connect  a  customer  to  an 
operator's network. 
A transfer for a specific period of a right or obligation which 
have  a 'public'  purpose.  It involves  an  activity  which  is 
performed on a commercial basis. 
refers  to  an  area  with  less  developed  voice  telephony 
infrastructure, where the cost of providing customer access 
to the voice telephony  network is  significantly higher than 
in well developed areas. 
This  is  the  additional  capital  required  by  an  operator  to 
conduct a particular activity.  The activity (or increment in 
activity) may, for example, relate to a customer or group of 
customers, or to a specific type of service. 
is a cost standard which measures  the change in total cost 
arising from a discrete or substantial increase/decrease in 
output (i.e. serving service). 
refers  to  the  total  change  in  revenue  as  a  result  of  a 
particular activity (or increment in activity). 
A periodic fixed  charge  based  on  the type  of service and 
facilities selected by the user. 
refers to the cost that an operator could avoid over the long 
run  if  it  was  to  discontinue  a  particular  activity  (or 
increment in activity). 
See long-run avoidable cost (above). 
A  customer  is  said  to  be  non-viable  when  the  total 
increment  in  revenue  associated  with  a customer is  less 
than  the  incremental  cost  incurred  by  the  operator  in 
serving that customer. 
29 Not lncromontal Cost 
Rato of  Roturn on 
Capital Employod 
Robalanclng of  Tariffs 
Sunk /nvostmonts 
Unavoldab/o Not Lassos 
Uneconomic Sorv/cos 
Us  or 
The  incremental  costs  less  all  associated  incremental 
revenues. 
or  "accounting  rate  of return",  is  the  ratio  of accounting 
profit to accounting capital employed. 
Process whereby prices for universal service elements are 
adjusted  relative  to  each  other  (e.g.  when  implementing 
cost related prices). 
Investments which once made cannot be fully recovered. 
The net loss an operator cannot avoid as a result of being 
obliged to provide uneconomic universal service or provide 
service to uneconomic customers. 
Services  for  which  the  incremental  cost  of  prov1s1on  is 
greater  than  all  the  associated  incremental  revenues(if 
any) the operator gets from the service. 
Users  means  end-users,  including  consumers  (e.g. 
residential  end-users),  and  service  providers,  including 
telecommunications organisations where the latter provide 
services which are or maybe provided by others. 
30 